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As progressives confront the problems of the twenty-first century, be
they global poverty and increasing income inequality, the scourge of HIV
and other diseases, educational disparities, or climate change, an increas-
ingly popular strategy is to enlist corporations in the effort.  Even as some
progressives continue to launch attacks on corporate misbehavior, often ex-
coriating corporations for causing and exacerbating the world’s greatest ills,
many progressives also understand that corporations can be part of the solu-
tion, not just the problem.
The growing popularity of corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) is
premised on the belief that modern corporations have the financial resources,
human capital, and global influence to advance progressive causes.1  And
though corporations themselves initiate CSR voluntarily—whether to add
value to the company’s brand, attract targeted consumers, forestall regula-
tion, or develop a particular corporate culture—a significant fraction of CSR
is a response to political and consumer campaigns by progressives.2  Indeed,
progressives have invested considerable energy and resources to target cor-
porations as potential agents for change.
However important CSR has become to the progressive agenda, and
however proudly many corporations bring attention to their CSR efforts,
progressives should not delude themselves into thinking that corporations
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1 The popularity of CSR movements is undeniably growing. See, e.g., Dashka Slater,
Resolved: Public Corporations Shall Take Us Seriously, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2007, § 6 (Mag-
azine), at 22 (documenting the growth of shareholder activism); see also Henry Blodget, The
Conscientious Investor, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 2007, at 78 (illustrating the growth of, and
problems with, socially responsible investing).  Of course, the debate over what social obliga-
tions corporations have, if any, has been vibrant for many decades.  For an early attempt to
preempt the rise of CSR, see Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to
Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at SM17.
2 For an assortment of motivations behind various activist campaigns see Charles Eesley
& Michael J. Lenox, Secondary Stakeholder Actions and the Selection of Firm Targets (May
30, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law & Policy Review), available
at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~mlenox/papers/stake_wp2.pdf.
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will act unilaterally on the public’s behalf.3  Corporations are constrained by
shareholders and market competition in their ability to allocate funds for
social causes, and the “win-win” scenarios in which firms maintain a com-
petitive advantage while also advancing social causes may be less common
than we would hope.  An inherent and inescapable tension exists between
pursuing desirable social outcomes and striving for maximum profits.  One
veteran Wall Street analyst remarked that any suggestion that socially re-
sponsible behavior leads to vast financial reward “is just dreaming.”4
Empirical research confirms the lack of evidence showing that good
deeds lead to good profits.5  Even studies that demonstrate a correlation be-
tween socially responsible corporate behavior and superior financial per-
formance cannot always convincingly illustrate which way the causal arrow
points because financially successful companies simply have more money to
dole out to social initiatives and larger marketing budgets to publicize their
CSR programs.  Further, because some companies overstate or misrepresent
the extent of their contributions, a practice commonly known as “green-
washing,”6 it can be difficult to determine which companies actually have a
meaningful social impact.  Metrics of social responsibility are sometimes so
faulty that companies that initially receive praise for being good citizens are
later exposed as laggards.7
Still, corporations can be pressured to invest their resources to advance
progressive causes, and progressive activists deserve praise for their several
successes in extracting socially desirable behavior from these profit-maxi-
mizing organizations.  But progressives have limited political capital, and
they need to expend that capital wisely.  Too often progressives pursue cam-
paigns that yield either fruitless results or token concessions from targeted
corporations.  While convincing corporate managers to pursue progressive
goals should remain a priority, progressives have significant room for im-
provement in understanding when and how to engage with corporations, and
3 See generally Aaron Chatterji & Siona Listokin, Corporate Social Irresponsibility, DE-
MOCRACY: J. IDEAS, Winter 2007, at 52, available at http://www.democracyjournal.org/article.
php?ID=6497.
4 See Blodget, supra note 1. R
5 See Aaron K. Chatterji, David I. Levine & Michael W. Toffel, How Well Do Social
Ratings Actually Measure Corporate Social Responsibility? (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Pa-
per No. 07-051, 2007), available at http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/07-051.pdf.
6 See Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Greenwash: Corporate Environmental Dis-
closure under Threat of Audit (Ross Sch. of Bus. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.
1055, 2006), available at http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/tplyon/Lyon_Maxwell_Greenwash_
March_2006.pdf.
7 One recent example of undeserved CSR praise is Morgan Stanley’s inclusion in Working
Mother magazine’s list of “100 Best Employers for Working Moms” shortly before paying
$54 million to settle a sex discrimination lawsuit. Marketplace: A List Mom Should Watch Out
For (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://marketplace.publicradio.org/
display/web/2007/09/24/a_list_mom_should_watch_out_for.  Ironically, Morgan Stanley cited
its inclusion on Working Mother’s list as part of its defense. Working Mother’s list is even
more suspect since many on the list fail to offer rudimentary family-friendly services, yet
purchase significant advertising in the magazine. Id.
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how to effectively expend the progressive movement’s limited political
resources.
We recommend that progressives adopt a “know your enemy”8 ap-
proach and consult the academic and practitioner knowledge on how corpo-
rations compete, pursue opportunities, and survive in the current business
and political environment.  A better understanding of corporations and cor-
porate behavior would enable progressives to more effectively procure cor-
porate cooperation with fewer political sacrifices.  In short, if the goal of the
progressive movement is to change corporate behavior, progressives must
first understand how corporations behave.
So, can corporations change the world for the better?  In this article, we
argue that the answer is “yes,” but not always in the ways progressives
might expect.  Progressives need to avoid traditional political tactics that rest
on categorical approaches, which usually rely on confrontation, condemna-
tion, and coercion.  Furthermore, progressives must eschew strategies that
manipulate corporate law in the hope of coercing corporations to act on be-
half of progressive causes9 or rely on moral suasion to compel corporations
to voluntarily solve vexing global problems.10  Tinkering with corporate le-
gal obligations to compel social responsibility will likely foster hostility,
spurring investment to undermine progressive efforts and, ironically, reduc-
ing the likelihood that corporations will work to solve larger social
problems. Instead, progressives must tailor their strategies to the strengths
and inclinations of the targeted corporations.  Our argument rests on the idea
that business organizations have embedded “capabilities” that both deter-
mine a particular corporation’s strengths and delimit the circumstances in
which a corporation can excel.
The implication is that progressives must recognize that the current po-
litical environment offers a continuum of strategies, and the effectiveness of
each is a function of the surrounding political and business environment.
Thus, progressives should carefully select their strategies and tailor their tac-
tics to the targeted company.  In the end—whether targeting the government
as voters, a firm as a political collaborator, or a corporation as consumers
and investors–-progressives will have more success, and will use their lim-
ited political resources more effectively, when they adopt the strategies we
outline in this paper.
To articulate this strategy, we first describe how global politics are
changing—most significantly, the shift from public governance to private
governance—and how corporations are adjusting to those political and eco-
nomic changes.  We conclude that corporations are increasingly focal actors
8 SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 129 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., Oxford University Press 2d
ed. 1971).
9 See Kent Greenfield, Saving the World With Corporate Law? (Boston Coll. Law Sch.,
Research Paper No. 130, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=978242.
10 See Slater, supra note 1. R
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in the battles that progressives wage, but that progressives have not incorpo-
rated a realistic model of corporate behavior into their strategies.  To remedy
this gap, we then delve into what the corporation is, explicating both its
potential and its limits.  The corporation is not an atomistic “black box” that
easily responds to changing incentives, but is rather a complex entity with
embedded capabilities and culture that are often ill-equipped for change.  As
such, we are skeptical of the potential effectiveness of progressive corporate
law, which targets all corporations indiscriminately, to deliver on progres-
sive goals.  Instead, we offer some alternative strategies based on a more
nuanced understanding of the firm in a world increasingly dominated by
private politics.
II. HOW PRIVATE GOVERNANCE IS CHANGING PROGRESSIVE POLITICS
For decades, progressive politics followed the traditional political para-
digm in which interest groups lobbied the government for certain policies.
However, as economic globalization has enabled and often compelled firms
to locate operations beyond the reach of domestic governments, this tradi-
tional paradigm has yielded to a new political landscape where private enti-
ties—non-governmental organizations (NGOs), corporations, and private
interest groups—have replaced domestic government’s traditional roles of
regulating quality, imposing standards, and providing public goods.  Increas-
ingly, progressives find themselves battling in unfamiliar territory, in the
realm of “private politics”11 where they must demand responses from pri-
vate entities.
Under traditional politics, movements that sought to alter corporate be-
havior targeted their political attention at domestic governments.  Interest
groups offered the currency of votes, campaign contributions, and political
mobilization.  They demanded in return regulations, taxes, or appointments
that would yield their desired social outcome.12  This strategy was vulnerable
to many sources of failure.  Often, the governmental action requested (and
often designed) by progressives to compel certain corporate behavior was
co-opted by targeted corporations, leading to what is commonly known as
“regulatory capture.”13  Meanwhile, the administrative state increasingly
delegated policymaking to professional and industry groups, so progressive
demands for product quality and safety, for example, led instead to collusive
behavior, entry barriers, and adverse outcomes—high prices and poor qual-
11 See, e.g., David P. Baron, Private Politics, Corporate Responsibility, and Integrated
Strategy, 10 J. OF ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 7 (2001).
12 For a general overview of interest group politics, see EDWARD C. BANFIELD & JAMES Q.
WILSON, CITY POLITICS (1963).  For an economic approach that models an exchange of votes
for campaign contributions, see Arthur D. Denzau & Michael C. Munger, Legislators and
Interest Groups: How Unorganized Interests Get Represented, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89
(1986).
13 The seminal article in the now-abundant literature on regulatory capture is George J.
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971).
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ity—for consumers.14  Political scientists have observed that even the most
successful progressive political movements have a tendency to become co-
opted by the governmental agencies from which they demand attention, thus
the very action demanded by the social movements becomes the source of
the movements’ failure.15
Nonetheless, progressive politics largely thrived within the traditional
political paradigm.  Progressive political efforts led to important civil rights,
labor rights, environmental, and public safety regulations.  Most notably, the
1960s and 1970s saw the passage of the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights
Act, the Clean Air Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act, the Age Discrimination and Employment Act, the
Endangered Species Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act.
However, the modern political economy has made progressive political
success substantially more difficult.  Largely because of economic globaliza-
tion, domestic governments have become increasingly unable to control the
social consequences of market forces.16  For example, increased production
outsourcing to low-wage nations has diminished the ability of minimum
wage legislation to further progressive wealth distribution in the production
chain and has hindered the ability of domestic governments to fully assert
their economic and social goals.  Globalization similarly restrains the effi-
cacy of labor laws, environmental regulations, and even tax codes.17
Consequently, nearly all the popular mechanisms that progressives had
previously relied upon are either incapable of achieving the desired objec-
tives or, frequently, harm the individuals they are targeted to help.  Demands
for permitting the unionization of garment workers, for example, accelerated
the outsourcing trend and left American workers without jobs, rather than
merely without union representation.  Heightened emissions regulations
pushed some manufacturers to the third world, where regulations were far
weaker than the U.S. rules that activists deemed inadequate in the first place
(thus increasing, rather than decreasing, total pollution).  The threat of going
overseas, to new workers and to a new regulatory environment, has given
corporations a trump card that progressives appear unable to confront
through traditional public politics.
14 See Clark C. Havighurst, Contesting Anticompetitive Actions Taken in the Name of the
State: State Action Immunity and Health Care Markets, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 587,
587–92 (1964).
15 FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS: WHY
THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL xxi–xxiv (Vintage Books 2d ed. 1979) (1977).
16 For the political consequences of economic globalization, see Gary Gereffi & Frederick
Mayer, Globalization and the Demand for Governance, in GARY GEREFFI, THE NEW OFFSHOR-
ING OF JOBS AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT (2006).  Some have described the subsequent regime
of private governance as “The NGO-Industrial Complex.”
Gary Gereffi et al., The NGO-Industrial Complex, 125 FOREIGN POL’Y 56, 64 (2001).
17 For a discussion of the impact of globalization on environmental regulation, and alterna-
tive global regulatory responses, see generally Jonathan Wiener, Global Environmental Regu-
lation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677 (1999).
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In response, progressives have expanded their efforts to reach into a
world of “private politics,” where private entities—corporations, industry
associations, and other commercial entities—are the targets of political ac-
tivity.  Progressives use the threat of consumer boycotts and the subsequent
possibility of decreased market share or damage to a corporate brand to
compel firms to act in accordance with a progressive political agenda.  The
rise of private politics represents a new political reality and a new menu of
political instruments that have emerged for progressive causes.
Accordingly, progressive activists now pressure companies to adopt
voluntary codes of conduct, invest in the local community, and disclose the
environmental impact of their operations.  Progressives also wage global ef-
forts to lobby trade associations and multinational conglomerates to set in-
ternational industry standards that achieve similar results.  Sometimes, these
efforts do little more than insulate firms from the threat of public politics and
potential government regulation.  But in many cases, these efforts lead to
self-regulation where corporations create industry-wide schemes to govern
themselves.  Self-regulating regimes rest on substantive measures, such as
voluntary standards, and often (but not always) on monitoring mechanisms
to ensure compliance.  Voluntary codes have been adopted in many indus-
tries, ranging from apparel to forestry.
In some respects, the rise of industry self-governance has constituted a
meaningful advance for progressive causes.  Adopting industry-wide stan-
dards is one way that corporations can solve collective action problems,
whereby one firm refrains from taking a socially conscious yet costly step on
its own unless it can guarantee that its competitors will do the same.  Stan-
dards can also facilitate the sharing of best practices across firms in a partic-
ular industry and lead to pro-social and pro-competitive cooperation.  In
these respects, industry-wide collusion can replace government regulation,
which would normally provide public goods and facilitate beneficial collec-
tive action.  Moreover, in a globalized world with many different markets,
progressives might more effectively enact rapid international change by en-
gaging industries directly.  For example, instead of lobbying hundreds of
national governments, progressives could lobby McDonald’s and other fast
food restaurants to adopt voluntary codes of conduct that require the listing
of nutritional information in all of their restaurants around the world.
However, substantial risks accompany reliance on corporate self-regu-
lation.  First, companies might lack the capability to monitor their own activ-
ities effectively.  Take the example of Mattel, which until recently had
received praise for one of the most rigorous safety protocols in the toy indus-
try.  Rather than have the government test the safety of every toy, companies
in the industry (including retailers, manufacturers, and contractors) devel-
oped voluntary codes of conduct to monitor safety.  Over many years, Mattel
had developed a trusting relationship with Lee Der, a Chinese contract man-
ufacturer, and allowed the Chinese firm to manufacture and test the safety of
the toys it made for Mattel.  While effectively “outsourcing product safety”
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to a foreign firm might seem controversial, international business scholars
have long argued that developing-country firms can acquire capabilities and
valuable technologies through alliances with multinational firms.  If Chinese
companies could successfully acquire capabilities to ensure product safety
from American firms, consumers all around the world could benefit.  Unfor-
tunately, that was not the result in this case.  Lee Der, under pressure to cut
costs, outsourced painting to another Chinese firm, which used lead paint.
The ensuing recall not only led to bad publicity for Mattel, but also to calls
for stricter regulation of the toy industry and for heightened product safety.
The legislative battle will likely center around strengthening the standards,
increasing the funding for the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and
requiring firms to pay for third-party pre-market testing.18
There is also a substantial likelihood that voluntary codes are little more
than window dressing.  This concern has been directed at De Beers and the
world’s diamond mines, which established the Kimberley Process in 2002 to
end the proliferation of “blood diamonds” that fund civil strife in war-torn
nations.19  The Kimberley Process requires that each diamond entering a
member nation’s market is certified to have come from a legitimate source.
However, a diamond’s origins are virtually impossible to guarantee, leading
some to fear that the Kimberley Process is little more than a “fig leaf” or,
worse, a marketing ploy to assure concerned customers rather than an en-
forcement tool to ensure compliance.20
Furthermore, in a world that relies on voluntary codes, even symbolic
certifications can dilute meaning or misinform consumers.  For example, if
NGOs and labor groups support a code of conduct that requires a particular
sector to pay workers a living wage, the industry association might introduce
a code with a suspiciously similar sounding acronym that offers to pay a
“prevailing wage.”  Even if substantial differences separate the two codes, it
would be nearly impossible for most observers to distinguish between them.
Most would likely demand only that the companies are abiding by some
code of conduct.  In the extreme case, the proliferation of codes dilutes the
value of each code that came before it, and even if some companies might
find it profitable to go beyond compliance with the industry standard, confu-
sion among consumers might convince them that it is not worth the trouble.21
18 Nicholas Casey & Nicholas Zamiska, Chinese Factory Is Identified in Tainted-Toy Re-
call; Mattel’s Reluctance Was Seen by Critics As Regulatory Flaw, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2007,
at A4.
19 Barak D. Richman, Ethnic Networks, Extralegal Certainty, and Globalisation: Peering
into the Diamond Industry 13 (Duke Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No.
134, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=949467.
20 Barak D. Richman & Joost Pauwelyn, Op-Ed., Blood Diamonds’ Many Facets, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh), Jan. 11, 2007, at A13.
21 Conversely, voluntary initiatives could encourage free riding, especially if there are no
sanctions to punish poor performers. See Andrew A. King & Michael J. Lenox, Industry Self-
Regulation Without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program, 43 ACAD.
OF MGMT. J. 698, 702 (2000).  There is a similar danger that voluntary measures would invite
selection effects, where only the best or the worst join a voluntary initiative. See Andrew King
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But the biggest problems with industry self-regulation, and the larger
challenge of private governance, mirror many of the problems that plagued
progressive efforts in the traditional paradigm of domestic politics.  Indus-
try-wide cooperation facilitates cartels, forecloses entry by new competitors,
and harms consumers.  Private interests easily hijack international efforts to
demand progressive results, and because the governmental and NGO actors
who put rules in place are even more remote and less accountable to popular
politics than domestic politicians, they succumb to interest group politics
with little resistance.  Consequently, interventions are manipulated by the
parties they target, minority groups who resist are easily co-opted, and, as
often occurs in domestic politics, international rules are often desired, rather
than avoided, by the parties the rules target.  By permitting corporations to
set market rules that favor incumbents and stifle innovation, industry self-
governance tends to be substantially more harmful than helpful to the targets
of progressive causes.
The flaws of industry self-regulation present difficult challenges for
progressives.  One potential response would be to devise measurements for
meaningful corporate social performance that could strengthen private gov-
ernance.  George Akerlof’s pioneering work teaches that information asym-
metries can have a significant impact on the functioning of markets.22  If a
responsible company has no credible mechanism through which to commu-
nicate its virtue to relevant stakeholders, it may reconsider costly invest-
ments in good deeds.  However, if a way to communicate this information to
interested parties exists, then a market can emerge to reward corporate social
responsibility.  The key is to devise meaningful yet transparent and straight-
forward metrics of social performance so that responsible companies actu-
ally stand to benefit by differentiating themselves.  By reducing the
information asymmetries between companies and their stakeholders,
progressives can make the market for social good work more effectively.23
However, the shift from public to private governance will require more
than better metrics.  The absence of a receptive government makes the chal-
lenge of achieving meaningful change more difficult, and progressives are
still in the process of adjusting to this new playing field and recognizing the
& Michael W. Toffel, Self-Regulatory Institutions for Solving Environmental Problems: Per-
spectives and Contributions from the Management Literature 13 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Tech. &
Operations Mgmt. Unit, Research Paper No. 07-089, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=985619.
22 See generally George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. OF ECON. 488 (1970).
23 In fact, there are several current efforts to standardize metrics and improve understand-
ing about how to measure social performance.  These include the Global Reporting Initiative,
which is based in Amsterdam, and is made up of experts on corporate sustainability from
around the world. See Global Reporting Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org (last visited
November 10, 2007).  Interestingly, companies are increasingly evaluating their own social
impact, which presents another opportunity for progressives and firms to find common ground.
Charitable organizations, such as the Gates Foundation, are also keenly aware of the need to
measure the impact of their philanthropy and could be enlisted in this effort as well.
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limits of many of the current approaches.  The new political framework has
placed corporations at the front lines of progressive politics, and progres-
sives need to find constructive ways to engage directly with these important
business organizations.
To succeed in this environment, we argue that progressives need to un-
derstand corporations as well as they understand the political system (and
perhaps even better, since the shift to private politics has made corporations
even more crucial in the battles that concern progressives).  We argue that a
careful study of how corporations behave could greatly inform progressive
strategies.  In the next section, we summarize some of the insights from this
body of academic research and explain how a deeper understanding of cor-
porations can help progressives engage in more successful private politics.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE FIRM
Since corporations have a strong inclination to resist, co-opt, or pre-
empt government directives, and since the spread of economic globalization
has made it even easier for corporations to avoid governments altogether,
progressives have understandably sought mechanisms to demand change
from corporations directly.  However, governments are critically different
from firms, as progressives realize when they find corporations unreceptive
and unresponsive to political rhetoric that has traditionally been effective in
the public sphere.  These differences extend far beyond the obvious contrast
between governments as vote maximizers and corporations as profit maxi-
mizers.  In fact, neither firms nor governments are singularities that are ex-
plainable by simplistic models.  Just as political scientists have invested
great energy in understanding the complexities of governments—how they
respond to environmental changes, how their internal mechanisms operate,
and how they implement actions—business scholars have similarly studied
the corresponding complexities of firms.
A deeper understanding of corporate behavior begins with the recogni-
tion that firms are not (as many activists—and neo-classical economists—
often presume) a mechanistic “black box” that dutifully translates inputs
into outputs.  A corporation thus cannot seamlessly redeploy itself in one
direction or the other, no matter the incentives.  Decades of academic schol-
arship have revealed that corporations are complex bundles of interdepen-
dent resources and capabilities that constrain their ability to undergo rapid
change in response to changes in the external environment.  In recognition of
these facts, organizational theorists, rooted in economics, sociology, and
other fields, aim to explain how disparate human resources and capital in-
vestments are gathered to create cooperative and productive behavior, de-
spite massive agency and organizational costs.
One particularly influential approach to understanding the firm that has
gained popularity in academic business circles rests on the observations that
firms have unique resources and capabilities that enable them to excel in the
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marketplace.  In this “resource-based view” (RBV) approach, “capabilities”
are defined as a firm’s core resources—they embody what the firm does
well.  These capabilities lie embedded within a firm’s infrastructure, reflect
both the firm’s human resources and its institutionalized routines, and are
difficult to duplicate or replicate by competitors.24
A firm’s capabilities include everything that enables the firm to excel in
the marketplace, and its financial success depends not only on the power of
its capabilities but also on its managers’ abilities to recognize the market
opportunities in which their firm’s capabilities would be best utilized.  The
challenges endemic to recognizing and capitalizing upon a firm’s capabilities
are especially salient in times of political, technological, or regulatory
change.  For example, when digital technologies began transforming the
photograph and camera markets, Kodak scrambled to adopt and profit from
the emerging technologies.  Its success came when it realized its unique ca-
pabilities were not reflected in its ability to develop new technologies, but
rather, in its ability to understand and meet consumers’ picture-taking needs
(as one executive succinctly stated, “Kodak is a picture company, not a tech-
nology company.”).  Kodak thus acquired externally-developed technologies
through joint ventures and acquisitions and focused its company resources
into harnessing the technologies to meet consumer needs.25  Similar recogni-
tions dictated the strategies of companies such as IBM and Dell towards the
computing market: IBM offers complex and high-tech consulting services
whereas Dell assembles components developed and designed by others.
The upshot is that capabilities are valuable and essential to market suc-
cess because they are hard to imitate, replicate, or purchase in the open mar-
ket.  While this enables firms with certain capabilities to consistently
outperform rivals with inadequate capabilities, it also presents challenges
when firms need to adjust to new market conditions.  One of the most puz-
zling yet persistent findings in recent business scholarship is that corpora-
tions have great difficulties adjusting to changing circumstances and
acquiring new capabilities.26  The literature is replete with horror stories
where successful firms failed to adjust to a new technological paradigm:
fountain pen manufacturers failed to acquire ball point technology, propeller
plane manufacturers fell to companies making jet engines, large mainframe
computing companies could not respond in time to the rise of the personal
computer.27  Even when market conditions demand immediate reform, firms
24 For a review of the “capabilities” literature, see generally David J. Teece et al., Dy-
namic Capabilities and Strategic Management, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 509 (1997).
25 See Jeffrey T. Macher & Barak D. Richman, Organisational Responses to Discontinu-
ous Innovation: A Case Study Approach, 8 INT’L J. INNOVATION MGMT. 87, 102–03 (2004).
26 See, e.g., Richard N. Foster, INNOVATION: THE ATTACKER’S ADVANTAGE 20–23 (1986).
27 See Philip Anderson & Michael L. Tushman, Technological Discontinuities and Domi-
nant Designs: A Cyclical Model of Technological Change, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 604, 617–18
(1990); see generally, William J. Abernathy & James M. Utterback, Patterns of Industrial
Innovation, 80 TECH. REV. 40, June–July 1978.
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have trouble adjusting away from the capabilities that were originally re-
sponsible for their success.28
The immediate lesson from the RBV approach is that corporations re-
spond best—to consumer demands, to technological shifts, to political pres-
sures—when they are asked to do something that is in line with their unique
capabilities.  As a starting point, progressives would do well to recognize
this institutional feature of business organizations.  Rather than focusing on
changing the incentive structure of business to engineer a desired social out-
come (an inexact science at best), we recommend that identifying the unique
capabilities of business and harnessing selected ones for the social good may
be more effective.  Moreover, we expect that companies will respond more
favorably to tailored campaigns that offer firms the opportunity to use capa-
bilities honed by competition for social gains.29  And conversely, it simply
makes little sense to request a corporation to do something it is not well
equipped to do.
The RBV theory offers other lessons for progressive activists, espe-
cially when activists are operating within a time of turbulent technological
change.  Even though capabilities are generally unique and firm-specific,
certain firms have been able to acquire new technologies despite their orga-
nizational constraints.30  Firms have been able to acquire new capabilities
through purchasing companies (and their capabilities), developing joint ven-
tures with companies that have different capabilities, or channeling re-
sources into internally financed corporate venture capital funds that invest in
new capabilities or new companies.31
Thus, progressives may be able to convince and assist companies to
acquire new capabilities that are useful for the social good.  For example,
progressives could partner with corporations in cooperative efforts to help
those corporations acquire targeted capabilities that are necessary for desired
reform.  Similarly, progressives could offer their own capabilities—in or-
ganizing, publicizing, and motivating social movements—and partner with
corporations.  Many corporations, such as Levi Strauss and Nike, for exam-
ple, employ activists to oversee their compliance offices and to develop cer-
tain socially responsible policies.  In short, if progressives understand how
28 There are a number of interrelated explanations for this phenomenon. See Rebecca M.
Henderson & Kim B. Clark, Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Prod-
uct Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 9, 16–18 (1990)
(arguing that because of information filters and the solidification of routines, firms have
trouble instituting organizational innovation); see generally CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE
INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1994) (ar-
guing that firms become overcommitted to current markets, at the expense of ignoring growing
future markets).
29 See Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2006, at
78, 80.
30 See Macher & Richman, supra note 25, at 88–89. R
31 See Gary Dushnitsky & Michael J. Lenox, When Do Firms Undertake R&D by Invest-
ing in New Ventures?, 26 STRAT. MGMT. J. 947, 947–48 (2005).
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corporations learn, they might be able to help corporations acquire the capa-
bilities to enable more socially desirable conduct and perhaps also become
more attractive to consumers.
Similarly, progressives should understand how corporations fail.  The
growing tendency of disruptive innovation—in which firms fail because
they cannot compete with an entrant with a new and superior technological
paradigm—offers progressives a similar opportunity.32  Progressives might
realize that certain industry leaders that persist in socially undesirable behav-
ior are prone to losing their leadership mantles to technology upstarts, and
progressives instead should target the new generation of leaders, rather than
wasting time and money on stubborn industry incumbents (for example, pro-
gressive campaigns to pool funds for, or encourage institutional and govern-
ment investment in, venture capital for clean energy as opposed to simply
protesting oil company profits).
In short, the resource-based view of the firm models competition as a
process in which firms play to their strengths.  Firms recognize the market
arenas in which, because of their unique capabilities, they can excel, and
they mobilize their resources accordingly so their talents translate into prof-
its.  In the world of private politics and private governance, this insight into
firm behavior is critical.  Armed with a more nuanced understanding of the
power and limits of corporations, progressives can begin to craft new strate-
gies to achieve gains through private politics.  In the next section, we offer
some practical examples that follow from this perspective, and explain when
and how progressives can work with the corporate sector to achieve social
change.
IV. HARNESSING CORPORATE POWER TO CHANGE THE WORLD
We believe that the new global landscape means that progressives
should update their playbook.  Progressives should not be discouraged by
shallow or unsuccessful corporate social responsibility efforts, but they
should stop expending their political capital unwisely.  We begin by observ-
ing that political strategies fall within a continuum that spans from tradi-
tional politics to the assorted and increasingly popular practice of private
politics: activists can act purely as voters and target elected officials, as
watchdogs and target industry associations, as collaborators with specific
companies, or purely as consumers and invite responses from commercial
interests.
Progressives can choose from this menu of strategies.  For example,
recalling the Mattel example described above, progressives can act as voters
that demand action from domestic politicians to reform the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission.  They can develop mechanisms in conjunction with
industry associations to monitor and reform international manufacture and
32 See generally CHRISTENSEN, supra note 28. R
\\server05\productn\H\HLP\2-1\HLP201.txt unknown Seq: 13 25-JAN-08 10:30
2008] The “Corporate” in Corporate Social Responsibility 45
trade of toys.  They can engage specifically with Mattel, who has worked
hard over many years to develop capabilities (that clearly failed in this in-
stance) to monitor outsourced contractors to assure quality.  And, at the
other extreme, progressives can exercise power as consumers, informing all
toy purchasers of the dangers of certain products and urging purchases from
only companies that address safety concerns.  In this case and many others,
progressives can pursue any combination of these strategies.  However,
given a fixed amount of financial resources and political capital, the progres-
sive movement might wish to focus on a particular strategy for maximum
impact.
Indeed, in many cases, progressives should lobby the government di-
rectly rather than wasting political capital and financial resources asking
business to do something that is not in its interest or even within its reach.33
As discussed above, this kind of traditional politics is more difficult than
ever before, but it still may hold more promise than asking corporations to
take actions not in their interest.  When a market failure requires government
intervention to solve a problem or provide a public good, and a government
is in a position to do so, then pursuing a traditional political strategy is the
optimal approach.  However, in many other cases—an increasing number,
with the rise of globalization and private governance—progressives should
pursue one or more of the strategies of private politics.  We discuss each,
paying particular attention to how these strategies are informed by the RBV
of corporate behavior.
A. The Progressive Industry
As we discuss above, the challenges of globalization have forced
progressives—especially when addressing problems such as child labor and
pollution that are deeply shaped by international commerce—to target indus-
tries rather than governments.  Progressives urge industries to adopt volun-
tary codes of conduct, set international industry standards, and construct
industry-wide monitoring schemes to police themselves.  We noted that
these strategies have been the natural successors to traditional political ef-
forts, since there is no viable international policeman, and that industry-wide
self-regulation can solve some collective action problems and facilitate the
widespread adoption of certain socially desirable practices.
The severe drawbacks of employing industry-wide strategies, of course,
are also well known and discussed above.  Such an approach can encourage
collusion, dishonesty, weak enforcement, and toothless standards.  For these
reasons, we encourage progressives to pursue mechanisms, such as the alter-
natives discussed below, that encourage (not stifle) competition between ri-
vals and force corporations to compete towards progressive goals.
Nonetheless, sometimes the collective action problem is sufficiently severe
33 See Chatterji & Listokin, supra note 3. R
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that industry-wide cooperation offers the only avenue for advancing progres-
sive causes.  The RBV theory might also suggest that industry-wide solu-
tions might be preferable to individual firm initiatives if a firm’s success has
been dependant on cross-fertilizations and joint ventures with other entities,
wherein the leading corporations have strong capabilities in transmitting and
acquiring information.  In these instances, corporations might be exceptional
cooperators and coordinators, and pursuing a collaborative, industry-wide
solution would build upon these capabilities.
B. The Progressive Corporation
Since capabilities are specific to individual firms, the RBV theory has
the greatest relevance when progressives have specific corporations as their
targets.  Whereas traditional political strategies—including proposals for re-
forming corporate law—suggest imposing burdensome requirements onto
firms, a strategy informed by the RBV school would provoke a firm to act in
the way it is most comfortable and capable.
Consider, for example, progressive efforts to improve wages for low-
skilled workers, and the aggressive campaign against Wal-Mart.  Wal-Mart
has thoroughly resisted calls for offering its workers better wages or compre-
hensive benefits—after all, the company excels at cutting costs.  Wal-Mart
does not just save on its own labor costs; it also pushes its suppliers to cut
costs and is adept at utilizing technologies like RFID to increase the effi-
ciency of its operations.  The core of Wal-Mart’s business model is to cut
costs aggressively through innovation, market power, and non-union labor to
offer the lowest possible prices for consumers.  The unique combination of
their capabilities has made the company quite successful and equally diffi-
cult to imitate.  When progressives ask Wal-Mart to pay its workers more
and offer greater benefits, the request runs counter to the heart of Wal-Mart’s
business model and assorted capabilities, and the firm naturally fights back.
Wal-Mart now spends considerable resources battling activists through lob-
bying, campaign contributions, advertisements, and other methods.  The re-
sult can only generously be described as a stalemate, with Wal-Mart
introducing very few changes to its business practices.
But Wal-Mart cannot be described as a categorical anathema to
progressives because it has contributed to other sorts of advances that
progressives are forced to admire.  The company has taken some high profile
first steps to use its renowned influence over suppliers to advance progres-
sive issues, such as global climate change.34  Wal-Mart has also announced a
plan to offer its own health insurance to its many full- and part-time employ-
ees.35  Since low-cost insurance is widely deemed to be a potential solution
34 Michael Barbaro, Wal-Mart Puts Some Muscle Behind Power-Sipping Bulbs, N.Y.
TIMES, at A1.  It is important to note that energy efficiency also serves Wal-Mart’s private
interest.
35 Press Release, Wal-Mart, Wal-Mart Announces Improvements to 2008 Benefits Pack-
age (Sept. 18, 2007), available at http://www.walmartfacts.com/articles/5301.aspx.
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to America’s growing insurance crisis, some health policy scholars consider
Wal-Mart’s initiative to be a model that others should copy.  These Wal-Mart
initiatives offer lessons to how progressives might engage Wal-Mart more
constructively.  Progressives should consider trying to enlist Wal-Mart, and
its very substantial cost-cutting capabilities, to promote the welfare of work-
ers through other means.  Wal-Mart could be a useful partner in devising
solutions to reduce health insurance costs nationwide, and Wal-Mart’s capa-
bilities might offer promise in addressing the larger crisis.
Companies with different capabilities could make different contribu-
tions for advancing different progressive objectives. One interesting counter-
example to Wal-Mart (and a sharp illustration of how different companies,
and their capabilities, are from each other), is De Beers.  Unlike Wal-Mart,
which excels at distributing high-volume, low-cost goods, De Beers excels
at limiting the global supply of diamonds and maintaining high quality.  De
Beers therefore is a natural ally in stemming the flow of conflict diamonds,
and progressive NGOs such as Global Witness have worked cooperatively
with the company to construct the Kimberley Process that is charged to
monitor the illegal trade.  Both the Kimberley Process’s effectiveness and De
Beers’s motives have been appropriately questioned, suggesting that conflict
diamonds continue to present a problem and that the current solution re-
quires improvement.36  Nonetheless, progressives were wise to solicit De
Beers’s experience in organizing global gem traffic and to pressure the com-
pany to be a partner in devising an acceptable solution.  In short, for the
same reason progressives should enlist Wal-Mart to introduce new products,
they should enlist De Beers to keep out problematic ones.
This approach-–tailoring demands on corporations according to their
capabilities, and matching the corporation with the appropriate progressive
cause—can apply to a host of important policy challenges.  One difficult
social problem, for example, involves assisting workers who are displaced
by trade.  Technology-intensive firms (such as 3M or Motorola, which regu-
larly bring new products to market) might assist progressives by identifying
certain worker skills that will be in demand as new markets emerge, and thus
could develop worker retraining strategies.  These companies already make
their living from predicting technological trends and making smart long term
investments in research and development. Progressives might simply ask
them to apply these capabilities to a vexing social problem like worker dis-
placement.  Financial services companies, such as Fidelity or Citicorp, might
help devise strategies for pension and retirement security.  Companies that
are experts in developing human capital like Goldman Sachs and McKinsey
might be enlisted to help in education reform.  Firms with expertise in logis-
tics, like UPS, could help in disaster relief.37
36 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. R
37 UPS did perform this role after a recent earthquake in Pakistan.  Press Release, United
Parcel Service, UPS Donates $2 Million to Earthquake Relief (Nov. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.pressroom.ups.com/pressreleases/archives/archive/0,1363,4628,00.html.
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One might say that just as a surgeon addresses her problems by wield-
ing her scalpel, a technology-intensive company turns to new technologies, a
luxury good company aims to preserve its brand and maintain quality, a low-
cost company strives to keep down costs, and so on.  Social activists would
be most productive if the demands they impose on a corporation were sensi-
tive to the corporation’s capabilities.  Asking firms to do what they do best,
rather than something they do not do at all, is the easiest way to create
positive results.
It bears repeating that many pressing social problems will not overlap
with a capability found in the private sector, and many complex tasks, like
maintaining security in Iraq, providing health care to the elderly and veter-
ans, and ensuring consumer safety, might instead be best suited for the pub-
lic sector.  Our recommendation is that progressive activists carefully
consider corporate capabilities when looking for resources to advance pro-
gressive goals.  When such capabilities can be helpful, progressives should
doggedly employ their political resources to convince, cajole, and compel
corporations to contribute to the cause.  If progressives correctly appraise a
firm’s capabilities to be uniquely helpful, they will likely find both that the
firm will provide invaluable help and that the firm will be receptive to the
overture.  If progressives fail to take capabilities into account, demand that
corporations act contrary to the core of their business model, and continue to
misunderstand the potential and limits of the private sector, they will con-
tinue to meet resistance.
C. The Progressive Consumer
All successful companies aim to meet the demands of consumers, and
to some degree enjoy a capability to detect and respond to market prefer-
ences.  Sometimes, often when firms resist direct engagement or when no
firm has a capability that can address a particular problem, progressives
might best serve their own cause by encouraging and shaping market compe-
tition by flexing their strength directly as individual consumers and inves-
tors. Moreover, consumers have the unique ability to pressure incumbent
companies into acquiring new capabilities or support entrepreneurial efforts
to develop new capabilities that could be useful in addressing global
problems.  In these consumer- and investor-focused strategies, which range
from public relations campaigns to information disclosure to shareholder
resolutions, progressives act to sway consumers and investors to use their
collective buying power to pressure companies into pursuing the common
good.
For example, progressives as consumers can urge corporations to pur-
sue socially responsible production practices.  One popular effort is to en-
courage a boycott of goods made with child labor, thus encouraging
corporations to assume the additional costs of pursuing desirable labor prac-
tices.  This would require a political effort that targets consumers that not
only conveys the importance of avoiding certain kinds of products but, more
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critically, informs consumers which goods to avoid.  While most consumers
would probably choose to avoid products made under unethical conditions,
in practice it is often difficult to communicate this information at the point of
sale.  Consumers might not wish to buy a shirt made by child laborers, but
how exactly is a consumer supposed to know which companies abide by
which codes of conduct, or what acronyms like FLA or WRC even mean?38
Progressives can define precise standards of “responsibility” and devise
mechanisms to provide this information to consumers so progressive con-
sumers can assert their power.  Furthermore, progressives can work together
with NGOs, governments, and companies themselves to develop standards,
but the key is to develop a single, transparent standard that consumers
understand.39
Along with consumers, investors can also use their power for the social
good.  Through shareholder resolutions or simply by pooling their shares
into large blocs like CalPERS, socially conscious investors can wield signif-
icant power.  For example, investors can be encouraged to pressure compa-
nies to divest from interests in trouble spots like Sudan.  This kind of
socially responsible investing (SRI) aims to reward responsible companies,
punish laggards, and provide incentives for all firms to improve their social
performance.  However, similar to the many existing codes of conduct, there
are also several competing definitions of corporate social responsibility.
Companies like KLD, Innovest, Calvert, and others have their own metrics
and ratings, but they often disagree,40 and if we cannot measure consistently
and convincingly which firms are more responsible than others, socially re-
sponsible investors cannot achieve their goals.  To address these issues,
progressives can support more accurate social measurement and channel
their money to the raters who get it right over the long term.  It is crucial to
validate social metrics, even if it sometimes provides ammunition to critics
of social investing. One simple strategy would be to provide a single respon-
sibility questionnaire to companies, similar to the common application used
in college applications, to reduce the response burden and increase response
rates.  Having companies answer a large set of questions once and only once,
and posting the data in the public domain, would likely increase the amount
38 The Fair Labor Association (FLA) and the Workers’ Rights Consortium (WRC) offer
two competing codes of conduct in the apparel industry.
39 As was noted above, industries and companies often do their part to muddy the waters,
introducing alternative and weaker standards with similar sounding acronyms that blur impor-
tant differences to outside observers. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  Thus,
progressives must ensure that their interactions with companies add clarity rather than obfusca-
tion, and do not result in a proliferation of codes that makes it difficult for consumers to
identify responsible firms and their products.
40 See Aaron K. Chatterji & David I. Levine, Imitation or Differentiation?: Evaluating the
Validity of Social Raters 2–5 (August 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard
Law & Policy Review).
\\server05\productn\H\HLP\2-1\HLP201.txt unknown Seq: 18 25-JAN-08 10:30
50 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 2
of information of corporate social responsibility without resulting in a
proliferation of “responsible company” lists and ratings.41
These are examples of how progressives can shape market demand, so
current firms—seeking to maintain or increase market share—are compelled
to alter their business practices. As mentioned above, progressives could
also seek to harness the power of consumers either to compel firms to seek
new capabilities or to encourage entry by new firms with capabilities that
can aid progressive causes.  For example, progressives might urge for reduc-
ing consumption of or boycotting a certain kind of good, like gasoline or
gas-guzzling SUVs, in the name of environmental sustainability.  The suc-
cess of this strategy depends on the availability of eco-friendly substitutes
that incumbent or entrant firms might consider offering.  Some environmen-
tal groups have pursued this approach by encouraging purchase of the
Toyota Prius or other fuel efficient cars.  The objective here is to induce
firms to invest research and production efforts into goods with socially desir-
able consequences that might not be lucrative without a certain consumer
consciousness and demand for those goods.  This way, progressives could
encourage socially desirable innovations.
Even if the investments in these innovations, or the switching costs
from offering an undesirable product (e.g. gasoline) to more desirable ones
(e.g. alternative fuels), may be too high to convince profit-maximizing firms
to proceed, progressives still might find ways to make the market work in
their favor.  Progressives might find useful metrics to grade the social re-
sponsibility commitments of firms based on their investment strategies.
British Petroleum, in an effort to appeal to environmental concerns, has pur-
sued a marketing strategy of “Beyond Petroleum,” but such ploys have little
meaning without reliable confirmation that they genuinely seek new capabil-
ities that would benefit the environment.  Just as progressives could inform
consumers of the social impact of certain goods, they also could inform con-
sumers as to which corporations are seeking desirable capabilities.
Thus, progressive efforts to inform and shape consumer behavior
should appreciate the potentially dynamic nature of firm capabilities.  Even a
small market could convince firms to pursue new opportunities and bet that
the market grows over time.  While social investing and consumption have
been increasing in recent years, for example, it is still unclear whether con-
sumer and investor based strategies ever have the potential to engage a broad
swath of society.  After all, as responsible as it may be to shop at Whole
Foods or buy a Toyota Prius, many consumers will never be able to afford
either.  However, if these consumers are especially prized by companies or
their purchasing power happens to be extremely influential, companies
might still make adjustments to attract them (for example, Wal-Mart’s recent
41 Different social investing companies, magazines, and other interested parties could still
develop their own “Part II” questionnaires with detailed questions on the environment, work-
ing conditions for women, or product safety.
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initiatives on organic food).42  Progressives have a crucial role to play in
informing consumers and investors, and thus increasing the pool of socially
conscious purchasing power and capital.  Still, it is just as important for
progressives to work on lowering the cost of responsible substitutes and im-
proving social measurement so that responsible companies can be identified
and rewarded. These are stiff challenges, but absolutely necessary to realize
the power of consumer and investor activism.
The great appeal of empowering consumers and investors as progres-
sives (or progressives as consumers and investors) is that it avoids many of
the shortcomings of both public and private politics.  Empowering consum-
ers and investors through information and educational awareness campaigns,
without establishing a formal organizational structure, reduces the possibility
of capture.  Whereas a governmental agency or voluntary organization dedi-
cated to monitoring behavior or disseminating information is prone to corpo-
rate takeover, a consumer-oriented movement requires no vulnerable
infrastructure.  Similarly, the lack of an organization that might unite indus-
try-wide competitors reduces the possibility of collusion, and the lack of a
governmental agency dedicated to address certain consumer or citizenry
needs dilutes the possibility of consumer complacency or cooptation.  Given
the significant deficiencies of industry-wide and firm-specific efforts, and
given the dramatically reduced role of public politics, preparing consumers
and investors to voice their political preferences to corporations might offer
the most promising opportunity for progressives.
In sum, allowing RBV theories to inform social activism implies a
strategy that allows firms to utilize their unique capabilities for the common
good.  Some corporations, after all, are remarkably good at what they do,
and some creative thinking could direct them to do good as well.  Similarly,
understanding the organizational limitations of corporations would compel
progressives to stop asking for what is impossible, and start engaging with
corporations to do what they can and enable them to learn what is necessary.
It is our view that some cases exist where corporate resources and capabili-
ties can be harnessed for admirable objectives.
It might also be said that these approaches embrace what could be con-
sidered to be the progressive movement’s unique “capabilities.”  We urge
progressives to remain ambitious and aggressive, to continue to think big
and tackle society’s most challenging problems, to engage with the private
sector’s wealthiest and most powerful institutions, and to invigorate consum-
ers and investors who adhere to progressive causes.  We merely encourage
progressives to also take into account these important lessons from the busi-
ness literature.  Effective progressive activism has and will always require
being creative, and devising strategies that harness corporate capabilities is
well within reach.  In short, we believe that by asking progressives to har-
42 See Pallavi Gogoi, Wal-Mart’s Organic Offensive, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Mar. 29, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/mar2006/nf20060329_6971.htm.
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ness corporate strengths to promote their agenda, we are asking progressives
to do what they do best.
V. CONCLUSION
The transition from public politics to private politics will require
progressives to refine their strategies for achieving social change and to rec-
ognize that corporations can sometimes become valuable collaborators.  To
effectively enlist corporations in the pursuit of progressive causes, progres-
sives must develop a better understanding of corporate behavior.  The asser-
tion that corporations maximize profits is only part of the story.  Rather than
viewing the firm as a “black box,” progressives need to understand that
corporations have specific capabilities, built over time, that allow them to
perform some tasks and not others.  As a result, attempts to reengineer the
firm from the outside are likely to fail, whether from legal mandates or from
uncompromising activists.
Instead, we advocate a realistic approach that incorporates the literature
on firm behavior and suggests the roles in which corporations could be most
fruitful.  We recognize the tremendous potential that corporations have to
change the world, but also emphasize the limits to using corporate assets to
advance the progressive agenda.
The key insights we offer rest on a basic point: if you want an economic
entity to yield certain results, you need to understand how it behaves.  The
shift from traditional to private politics has made the corporation a focal
actor in progressive battles, and we argue that a careful consideration of how
the firm actually operates might inform a more successful progressive politi-
cal strategy.  In our view, if progressives can creatively adjust their demands
on corporations to what those corporations do best, then CSR just might live
up to its promise.
